Sensory substitution presents the philosopher of cognitive science with a particularly interesting case. Using prosthetics to map visual stimuli onto other modalities, such as touch or audition, otherwise blind individuals may develop perceptual capacities and behaviours commonly associated with sight. Experienced users can distinguish ‘visually’ presented objects and will even jerk back from a looming surface. Whether perception with sensory substitution devices should be classed as a type of vision, some other modality, or a new sense remains a matter of (...) debate, however. In the following, I review arguments commonly used to rebut the visual interpretation and, drawing on recent experimental studies and phenomenological self-reports, construct a novel case for treating sensory substitution as a visual process. (shrink)

The import of Hodgkin and Huxley’s classic model of the action potential has been hotly debated in recent years, with particular controversy surrounding claims by prominent proponents of mechanistic explanation. For these authors, the Hodgkin-Huxley model is an excellent predictive tool but ultimately lacks causal/explanatory import. What is more, they claim that this is how Hodgkin and Huxley themselves saw the model. I argue that these claims rest on a problematic reading of the work. Hodgkin and Huxley’s model is both (...) causal and, in an important sense, explanatory. (shrink)

This essay examines Ewald von Kleist’s 1745 invention of the Leyden jar using previously overlooked letters and features of his experimental apparatus to address lingering mysteries concerning the discovery. It has traditionally been claimed that Kleist unknowingly violated standard practice by grounding the device, the assumption being that this was the only way to obtain his remarkable results. In recent years, however, this interpretation has faced serious challenges, with experimental replications showing substantial shocks without grounding and period sources providing reason (...) to think that Kleist was insulated during the process. Supposing that Kleist was insulated raises puzzles of its own, however, as his results appear more extreme than such a charging method suggests. The missing piece, the author argues, is found in the unique nature of his setup. Drawing on established and novel sources, the essay shows how Kleist’s operation of his generator resulted in a closed circuit, explaining the strong charges cited by proponents of the traditional mistake narrative while upholding the absence of grounding. (shrink)